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SZELIGA V. LAMONE: AN END TO GERRYMANDERING IN
MARYLAND—OR PERHAPS JUST A PAUSE
STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO*
INTRODUCTION
Federal litigation over Maryland’s 2011 congressional districts1 failed
to rein in partisan gerrymandering based on the U.S. Constitution.2 Thus the
Maryland General Assembly enacted a similar map in December 2021.3 But
even though the U.S. Supreme Court barred federal courts from hearing
partisan gerrymandering claims under the U.S. Constitution, the Court noted
that partisan gerrymandering claims could still be brought in state courts
under state law.4

© 2022 Stephen M. Shapiro.
* J.D., The George Washington University Law School; M. Eng’g, Virginia Polytechnic
Institute & State University; B.S.M.E. Tufts University. The author would like to recognize the
Honorable Joseph M. Getty on his recent retirement from the Court of Appeals of Maryland. See
also Tribute, Tribute to Chief Judge Joseph M. Getty, 82 MD. L. REV. 160 (2022). Chief Judge Getty
has participated in almost every redistricting matter in Maryland in recent decades—as a legislator,
litigant, counsel, amicus, or judge.
1. MD. DEP’T OF PLANNING, MARYLAND 2011 CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS (2016),
https://planning.maryland.gov/Redistricting/Documents/2010maps/Cong/Statewide.pdf.
2. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506–07 (2019) (also deciding Lamone v.
Benisek, No. 18-726, and holding “that partisan gerrymandering claims present political questions
beyond the reach of the federal courts”). Benisek challenged Maryland’s 2011 congressional
districts, id. at 2493, while Rucho similarly challenged North Carolina’s congressional districts, id.
at 2491. The author was an original plaintiff in Benisek when he first filed that case in 2013. See id.
at 2493; see also Shapiro v. McManus, 577 U.S. 39, 41–42 (2015).
3. See H.B. 1, Congressional Districting Plan, 2021 Gen. Assemb., Spec. Sess. (Md. 2021),
https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Legislation/Details/hb0001?ys=2021S1&search=True
(introduced by request of the Legislative Redistricting Advisory Commission); House Bill 1
Congressional Map, MD. GEN. ASSEMB., https://redistricting.mgaleg.maryland.gov/PlanViewerHB1-Congressional/#MD-2020CONGRESSIONAL-OFFICIAL (last visited July 12, 2022); MD.
LEGIS. REDISTRICTING ADVISORY COMM’N, FINAL RECOMMENDED CONGRESSIONAL MAP
(2021),
https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/Other/Redistricting/Final/webpage-final.pdf
(the
Commission’s recommended map, which was enacted without change). Like the 2011 map, the
December 2021 map comprised one Republican-leaning district, the First District, and seven
Democratic-leaning districts. See infra Figure 2 (partisan & racial data for the December 2021
districts). See generally Jim Newell, Democrats Could Have Gerrymandered Away a GOP Seat.
Why Didn’t They?, SLATE (Dec. 10, 2021, 12:31 PM), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2021/12/maryland-redistricting-democrats-gerrymandering-andy-harris.html (providing
political background on the development of the December 2021 congressional districts).
4. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507–08.
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Two sets of Maryland voters filed such actions, challenging Maryland’s
December 2021 map as inconsistent with multiple provisions of Maryland’s
Constitution and Declaration of Rights.5 After a four-day trial,6 the Circuit
Court for Anne Arundel County enjoined the use of the December 2021 map,
and ordered the General Assembly to enact a remedial map with compact
districts.7 The General Assembly complied with the court’s order,8 and the
parties agreed to drop appeals from the court’s order as well as objections to
the Assembly’s remedial map.9 The settlement cleared the way for Maryland
Governor Larry Hogan to sign the remedial map into law on April 4, 2022.10
The path forward would have been quite uncertain had the General Assembly
failed to timely comply with the court’s order, as the court stated at trial that
it lacked authority to draw a remedial map itself.11
While Maryland now has reasonably compact congressional districts for
the 2022 elections, it is not clear how long thereafter the General Assembly
will have to maintain them.12 The U.S. Supreme Court will hear a case during
5. See Complaint for Declaratory Relief and Other Relief Regarding the Redistricting of
Maryland’s Congressional Districts, Parrott v. Lamone, No. C-02-CV-21-001773 (Md. Cir. Ct. Dec.
21, 2021) [hereinafter Parrott Complaint]; Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Szeliga
v. Lamone, No. C-02-CV-21-001816 (Md. Cir. Ct. Mar. 25, 2022) [hereinafter Szeliga Complaint].
6. The court consolidated both actions for trial under No. C-02-CV-21-001816.
7. See Declaratory Judgment, Permanent Injunction, and Order of Remand at 3, Szeliga, No.
C-02-CV-21-001816 (Md. Cir. Ct. Mar. 25, 2022) [hereinafter Szeliga Declaratory Judgment].
8. See MD. DEP’T OF PLANNING, MARYLAND 2022 CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS
(STATEWIDE)
(2022),
https://planning.maryland.gov/Redistricting/Documents/2020Maps/Cong/2022-CongDist-SW.pdf;
MD. DEP’T OF LEGIS. SERVS., FISCAL AND POLICY NOTE, S.B. 1012, 2022 Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (2022), https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2022RS/fnotes/bil_0002/sb1012.pdf. Senate Bill 1012,
as passed, was contingent upon the Court of Appeals not reversing the Circuit Court of Maryland
for Anne Arundel County’s judgment. See also infra Figure 4 (partisan and racial data for the April
2022 districts).
9. See Order, Lamone v. Szeliga, Case No. COA-REG-0065-2021 (Md. Apr. 4, 2022);
Lamone, 478 Md. 241, 273 A.3d 888 (2022); ‘Tremendous Victory’: Hogan Signs New
Congressional Redistricting Map into Law After Appeal Dropped, WBAL-TV 11 BALT. (Apr. 4,
2022, 5:14 PM), https://www.wbaltv.com/article/maryland-congressional-redistricting-mapappeal-withdrawn/39628879.
10. S.J. Res. 2, 2022 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2022).
11. This is the author’s recollection of statements Judge Battaglia made from the bench on the
first day of trial on March 15, 2022. See also infra note 154 (discussing Getty v. Carroll County
Board of Elections, 399 Md. 710, 741, 926 A.2d 216, 235 (2007)).
12. The author, a registered Democratic voter in Maryland, has decidedly mixed feelings as to
whether the General Assembly should limit gerrymandering as a matter of policy after Rucho. Under
Rucho, other states may observe no limit unless their state law provides otherwise. Rucho v.
Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2507 (2019). Thus, there is now no level nationwide playing field,
and a state legislature that opts not to gerrymander its state’s districts thereby opts to waive its power
to influence the partisan control of the U.S. House of Representatives. Even if the compromise
inherent in the April 4, 2022, map were not now required as a matter of law, the author would
endorse it as a matter of policy—where the districts still afford Democrats an advantage, but not to
the extent that Republican votes are invidiously diluted and the districts’ representational function
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its October 2022 Term that challenges a decision by the Supreme Court of
North Carolina that its state constitution similarly limits partisan
gerrymandering of congressional districts.13 The outcome may well bear on
the continued viability of the reasoning in the circuit court’s opinion limiting
partisan gerrymandering in Maryland.14
Part I discusses the causes of action raised by the parties under the
Maryland Constitution and Declaration of Rights, their disposition by the
court, and one further key provision of the Maryland Constitution, held to
address congressional redistricting, that also supports the court’s judgment.15
Part II examines the authority of Maryland and federal courts to remedy a
defective map by drawing a replacement. Part III notes some of the key issues
currently before the Supreme Court in Moore v. Harper,16 and how their
disposition may bear on the continued viability of Szeliga v. Lamone.17
I. CAUSES OF ACTION UNDER THE MARYLAND CONSTITUTION AND
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
The Parrott v. Lamone18 plaintiffs claimed that the December 2021 map
violated Article III, Section 4 of the Maryland Constitution, as well as Article
7 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.19 The Szeliga plaintiffs claimed that
the December 2021 map violated Article I, Section 7 of the Maryland
Constitution, as well as Articles 7, 24, and 40 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights.20 While not addressed by the parties, Article III, Section 49 addresses
congressional districting in parallel with Article I, Section 7.21

is damaged. Compare infra Figures 1 & 2 (showing the December 2021 districts and their partisan
data), with infra Figures 3 & 4 (showing the April 2022 districts and their partisan data).
13. Harper v. Hall, 868 S.E.2d 499 (N.C. 2022), cert. granted sub nom., Moore v. Harper, No.
21-1271 (U.S. June 30, 2022).
14. Szeliga v. Lamone, No. C-02-CV-21-001816 (Md. Cir. Ct. Mar. 25, 2022).
15. Article III, Section 49 of the Maryland Constitution authorizes the General Assembly to
regulate elections. See infra Section I.A.2. Part I also suggests, in notes, that the generally-allowable
10% population variance for General Assembly districts is not a safe harbor, see infra note 52, that
the definition of “contiguity” should be applied in a manner reflecting its purpose, see infra note 59,
and that state courts have latitude in applying Supreme Court holdings on justiciability, although it
is unclear whether a claim posing a nonjusticiable federal question is removable, see infra note 102.
16. No. 21-1271 (U.S. cert. granted June 30, 2022).
17. No. C-02-CV-21-001816 (Md. Cir. Ct. Mar. 25, 2022).
18. No. C-02-CV-21-001773 (Md. Cir. Ct. Dec. 21, 2021).
19. Parrott Complaint, supra note 5, ¶¶ 86–108.
20. Szeliga Complaint, supra note 5, ¶¶ 59–82.
21. See infra Section I.A.2.
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A. Article I, Section 7 and Article III, Section 49 of the Maryland
Constitution
Article III, Section 49 of the Maryland Constitution is analogous to the
Elections Clause of Article I, Section 4 of the Federal Constitution in that it
broadly authorizes the General Assembly to set the “time, place and manner
of holding elections in this State.” Article I, Section 7, which protects the
“purity of elections,” can be considered a subset of Article III, Section 49.
However, only Article I, Section 7 was raised as a basis of a claim in these
proceedings, and the Court dismissed that claim prior to trial. In addition to
discussing this claim in Section I.A.1, the Article will discuss the potential
utility of Article III, Section 49, or both provisions together, in a claim against
partisan gerrymandering in Section I.A.2. The federal Elections Clause
assigns the General Assembly these same duties with respect to congressional
elections, but it has been held not to authorize legislatures to “favor or
disfavor a class of candidates.” However, the U.S. Supreme Court has also
held that standards do not exist to allow federal courts to enforce this
limitation in the context of congressional districts. While this path is currently
closed to federal courts, it may be viable for Maryland courts.
1. Consideration of Article I, Section 7 in the Szeliga Proceedings
This Section addresses the Szeliga plaintiffs’ claim under Article I,
Section 7, which was the only claim that the court dismissed prior to trial.
Article I, Section 7 of the Maryland Constitution reads: “The General
Assembly shall pass Laws necessary for the preservation of the purity of
Elections.”22 The Szeliga plaintiffs interpreted this provision as requiring “the
General Assembly to pass laws concerning elections that are fair and
evenhanded, and that are designed to eliminate corruption.”23 This
interpretation views the General Assembly’s duty to enact relevant laws as
also being a limitation on its power to enact laws inconsistent with that duty,
such as a law that would contaminate the purity of elections.24 The Szeliga
plaintiffs further alleged that the cracking of Republican voters was neither
fair nor evenhanded,25 and that “[l]ike all extreme political gerrymanders

22. MD. CONST. art. I, § 7.
23. Szeliga Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 66. But see infra notes 28, 35 and accompanying text
(summarizing the State defendants’ arguments).
24. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary
Judgment at 18, Szeliga v. Lamone, No. C-02-CV-21-001816 (Md. Cir. Ct. Mar. 25, 2022)
[hereinafter Szeliga Plaintiffs’ Opposition] (citing Socialist Workers Party v. Sec’y of State, 317
N.W.2d 1, 11 (Mich. 1982)); id. at 19 (first citing Nader for President 2004 v. Md. State Bd. of
Elections, 399 Md. 681, 696–97, 926 A.2d 199, 207–09 (2007); and then citing Wells v. Kent Cnty.
Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 168 N.W.2d 222, 227 (Mich. 1969)).
25. Szeliga Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 67.
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before it, the [December] 2021 Plan amount[ed] to election rigging.”26 Lastly,
they contended that the December 2021 districts violated Article I, Section 7
of the Maryland Constitution by “undermin[ing] democracy” in that their
design “ensur[ed] that the people cannot choose those who they want to
govern them.”27
The State defendants characterized Article I, Section 7 as enforcing a
duty “to prescribe the mechanics of elections, and to embody those
mechanics with protections against corruption or fraud” but not imposing any
“restriction on the General Assembly’s authority.”28
The court granted the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with respect to the
Szeliga plaintiffs’ Article I, Section 7 claim.29
2. Further Consideration of Article I, Section 7 and Article III,
Section 49 Based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s Interpretation of
the Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution30
The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Elections Clause in Article
I, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution as imposing a duty upon the General
Assembly that is nearly identical to the Maryland Court of Appeals’
interpretation of Article I, Section 7 and Article III, Section 49 of the
Maryland Constitution.31 Article III, Section 49 provides that “[t]he General
Assembly shall have power to regulate by Law, not inconsistent with this
Constitution, all matters which relate to the Judges of election, time, place
and manner of holding elections in this State, and of making returns
thereof.”32
26. Id. ¶ 68.
27. Id. ¶ 69.
28. Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for
Summary Judgment at 35, Szeliga, No. C-02-CV-21-001816 [hereinafter Szeliga Memo. in Support
of MTD] (citing Cnty. Council for Montgomery Cnty. v. Montgomery Ass’n, Inc., 274 Md. 52, 60–
65, 333 A.2d 596, 600–03 (1975)).
29. Order at 2, Szeliga, No. C-02-CV-21-001816 [hereinafter Szeliga Order on MTD]
(dismissing the Article 1, Section 7 claim with prejudice). This Order did not dismiss any of the
other claims asserted by the Szeliga Plaintiffs or the Parrott Plaintiffs. Id.; see also Szeliga, No. C02-CV-21-001816, at 11 n.13 (providing the court’s reasoning for dismissing the Article I, Section
7 claim).
30. The plaintiffs did not raise claims under Article III, Section 49 of the Maryland
Constitution.
31. Compare Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932) (holding that the Elections Clause
affords state legislatures “authority to provide a complete code for congressional elections . . . to
enforce the fundamental right involved”), with Cnty. Council for Montgomery Cnty. v. Montgomery
Ass’n, 274 Md. 52, 60–61, 333 A.2d 596, 600–01 (1975) (recognizing that the current Article I,
Section 7, and Article III, Section 49 “demonstrate that . . . the regulation of elections would be the
province of the State Legislature,” for which “[t]he General Assembly has responded . . . by enacting
a comprehensive State Election Code . . . . covering every aspect of the electoral process in
Maryland” including the “establishment of United States Congressional Districts”).
32. MD. CONST. art. III, § 49.
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The Supreme Court has further interpreted the Elections Clause as
forbidding statutes crafted to favor or disfavor a political party or candidate.33
Thus the Elections Clause imposes upon the General Assembly both a duty—
to enact regulations that enable the voters to choose their representatives, and
a limitation—not to assume a proactive role in making these choices. The
duty is similar to the one imposed by Article I, Section 7 of the Maryland
Constitution, as suggested by the State defendants, as well as by Article III,
Section 49. The limitation is similar to the one implied by Article I, Section
7 of the Maryland Constitution, as suggested by the Szeliga plaintiffs, as well
as by Article III, Section 49.34 The Maryland Court of Appeals has not
considered whether Article I, Section 7 or Article III, Section 49 incorporate
a limitation similar to that under the Elections Clause.35 Under Rucho v.
Common Cause,36 the extent of any limit on partisan favoritism under the
Elections Clause is currently undefined by any standard, and thus
unenforceable, at least by federal courts, with respect to the design of
congressional districts.37 But the Maryland provisions may well be more
susceptible to a judicially enforceable limit.38
The Elections Clause provides that “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in
each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by
Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing
Senators.”39 The U.S. Supreme Court in Smiley v. Holm40 stated that:
It cannot be doubted that these comprehensive words embrace
authority to provide a complete code for congressional elections,
not only as to times and places, but in relation to notices,
registration, supervision of voting, protection of voters, prevention
of fraud and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of
inspectors and canvassers, and making and publication of election
returns; in short, to enact the numerous requirements as to
procedure and safeguards which experience shows are necessary
in order to enforce the fundamental right involved.41
33. See Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 523 (2001) (“[T]he Framers understood the Elections
Clause as a grant of authority to issue procedural regulations, and not as a source of power to dictate
electoral outcomes, to favor or disfavor a class of candidates, or to evade important constitutional
restraints.”) (quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 833–34 (1995))).
34. See infra text accompanying notes 39–50.
35. See Szeliga Memo. in Support of MTD, supra note 28, at 35.
36. 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
37. Id. at 2506 (concluding “that neither § 2 nor § 4 of Article I ‘provides a judicially
enforceable limit . . . when districting’” (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 305 (2004))).
38. See infra Section I.B. for a discussion of Article III, Section 4 of the Maryland Constitution.
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl.1.
40. 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
41. Id. at 366.
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Thus, the Court in Smiley viewed the federal Elections Clause as
assigning the state legislatures the duty, and corresponding authority, to
establish the logistics necessary for voters to exercise their representational
rights. Smiley did not address whether the Elections Clause confers authority
to determine these logistics so as to influence election outcomes. As will soon
be discussed, those cases arose sixty years later.
The Supreme Court’s view of the federal Elections Clause in Smiley
closely tracks the Maryland Court of Appeals’ discussion of Article I, Section
7 and Article III, Section 49 of the Maryland Constitution in County Council
for Montgomery County v. Montgomery Association42:
These provisions demonstrate that the framers of our Constitution
contemplated that the regulation of elections would be the province
of the State Legislature. The General Assembly has responded to
these constitutional directives by enacting a comprehensive State
Election Code which is contained in Article 33 of the Annotated
Code of Maryland.
Article 33 contains detailed provisions covering every aspect
of the electoral process in Maryland. Among other things provided
for by the Election Code are administrative supervision of election
procedures, location of polling places, creation of precinct
boundaries, . . . registration of voters and absentee registration, use
of paper ballots, use and operation of voting machines, . . .
tabulation of votes, . . . resolution of contested elections,
presidential electors, dates of election for United States Senators
and Representatives, establishment of United States Congressional
Districts, regulation of referenda, . . . and . . . a Fair Campaign
Financing Fund.43
The Maryland Court of Appeals in County Council viewed these
provisions of the Maryland Constitution as applying a similar if not identical
duty upon the General Assembly as does the federal Elections Clause as
viewed in Smiley. However, the Maryland duty covers all elections,
specifically including congressional elections, while the federal Elections
Clause covers only congressional elections. And with respect to
congressional elections, the scope of the Maryland duty as interpreted in
County Council, appears consistent with the scope of the federally imposed
duty as interpreted in Smiley. County Council expressly refers to the scope as
a “directive” to the legislature, while Smiley refers to it as an “authority.” But
the presence of both a duty and the authority to carry out that duty are at least
42. 274 Md. 52, 333 A.2d 596 (1975).
43. Id. at 60–61, 333 A.2d at 601 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added); see also Recent
Decision, County Council v. Montgomery Association, Inc., 274 Md. 52, 333 A.2d 596 (1975), 35
MD. L. REV. 543, 544 (1976).
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implied in each decision. Twenty years after County Council, the U.S.
Supreme Court had occasion to take up the limitation question.
In Cook v. Gralike,44 the Supreme Court reaffirmed that “the Framers
understood the Elections Clause as a grant of authority to issue procedural
regulations, and not as a source of power to dictate electoral outcomes, to
favor or disfavor a class of candidates, or to evade important constitutional
restraints.”45 Gralike struck down a ballot design imposed by a recent
Missouri constitutional amendment to disfavor candidates taking a policy
position opposed to term limits.46 As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in his
concurring opinion, “[t]he result [was] that the State inject[ed] itself into the
election process at an absolutely critical point—the composition of the ballot,
which [was] the last thing the voter [saw] before he ma[de] his choice—and
[did] so in a way that [was] not neutral as to issues or candidates.”47
In Rucho v. Common Cause, the Supreme Court reached a conclusion
that differed from that in Gralike, holding that the Elections Clause did not
afford a discernible limit on the extent of partisanship permissible in the
design of congressional districts.48 However, the Court in Rucho further
noted that a state provision, such as one prohibiting districts “drawn with the
intent to favor or disfavor a political party,” would be judicially enforceable.49
Just as the Maryland Court of Appeals in County Council interpreted
Maryland’s Constitution to include a duty similar to that which the U.S.
Supreme Court found within the Elections Clause in Smiley, the Court of
Appeals could similarly find the Maryland provisions to include a limitation
similar to that subsequently found by the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. Term
Limits and Gralike. Thus, Article I, Section 7 and Article III, Section 49 of
44. 531 U.S. 510 (2001).
45. Id. at 523 (quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 833–34 (1995)).
46. Id. at 524–26.
47. Id. at 532 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment).
48. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506 (2019). Rucho does not discuss Gralike,
which ostensibly remains good law. Considering the two cases together, the Court’s current
guidance is that state statutes regulating elections may generally not favor or disfavor parties or
candidates—but the design of congressional districts is an exception, where such partisanship is not
limited by the U.S. Constitution. See also infra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing the use
of Article III, Section 4 of the Maryland Constitution as a standard for enforcing Article I, Sections
2 and 4 of the U.S. Constitution).
49. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507 (quoting id. at 2524 n.6 (Kagan, J., dissenting)). Thus, while the
Court in Rucho did not discuss Gralike, it nevertheless used a phrase from Gralike—describing
what the Elections Clause does not generally permit, to describe what a hypothetical provision of
state law could forbid as to congressional districts. Gralike, 531 U.S. at 523. The only apparent
difference is that the Election Clause limitation in Gralike is implied—and at least in part reinforced
by the First Amendment, see id. at 530 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment), and by Article I,
Section 2, see id. at 528 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 842
(Kennedy, J., concurring)), while the hypothetical limitation envisioned in Rucho would be
expressly stated.
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the Maryland Constitution could be interpreted to afford the General
Assembly both a duty and a limitation of authority similar to those afforded
by the Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution. And while the U.S. Supreme
Court has thus far declined to extend this limitation to cover the design of
congressional districts, the Maryland Court of Appeals could find that such a
limitation from within the comparable Maryland constitutional provisions
can be judicially applied to the design of congressional districts.50
B. Article III, Section 4 of the Maryland Constitution
The Parrott plaintiffs claimed that the December 2021 congressional
districts violated Article III, Section 4 of the Maryland Constitution.51 This
provision states that “[e]ach legislative district shall consist of adjoining
territory, be compact in form, and of substantially equal population. Due
50. See infra note 102 and accompanying text discussing that state courts are not bound by U.S.
Supreme Court holdings as to political questions when interpreting or applying similar state
constitutional provisions, and perhaps not even when interpreting the same federal provision.
Following the example set by the trial court in Szeliga, a Maryland court could draw the line at the
point where partisan favoritism results in districts that fail the compactness and adjoining territory
requirements that apply to state legislative districts under Article III, Section 4. Cf. Szeliga v.
Lamone, No. C-02-CV-21-001816, at 10–11 (Md. Cir. Ct. Mar. 25, 2022) (determining that similar
provisions of the Maryland Constitution and Declaration of Rights “provide a nexus to Article III,
Section 4” which can serve as a standard for enforcing those provisions); id. at 21–23 (citing Md.
Green Party v. Md. Bd. of Elections, 377 Md. 127, 142, 144, 150, 832 A.2d 214, 223–24, 224–25,
227 (2003)). Grounds for finding such a nexus here are even stronger when paired with Article I,
Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, which focuses on representational rights. See U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 2. While these representational rights have most notably included the right to vote for members
of Congress, see, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 820–21, they encompass further important
aspects of representation, such as how district designs may support or detract from effective
representation. Cf. Va. House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945, 1956 (2019) (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (describing the impact of a district’s design on representation); In re Legis. Districting
of State, 299 Md. 658, 689, 475 A.2d 428, 444 (1984) (citing Schrage v. State Bd. of Elections, 430
N.E.2d 483, 489 (Ill. 1981), where the Supreme Court of Illinois found that a noncompact design
“significantly impedes” representation)). While the U.S. Supreme Court has not found Article I,
Sections 2 and 4 to afford a judicially enforceable standard themselves, see Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at
2506 (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 305 (2004)), Article III, Section 4 of the Maryland
Constitution could similarly serve as a standard to judicially enforce Article I, Sections 2 and 4 of
the federal Constitution within Maryland. See Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum at 2, Szeliga,
No. C-02-CV-21-001816 [hereinafter Szeliga Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Motion] (citing In re Legis.
Districting of State, 299 Md. at 676 n.9, 475 A.2d at 437 n.9); see also Howlett ex rel. Howlett v.
Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367, 371 (1990) (explaining that federal law is a fully integrated part of each
state’s own law); Lamb v. Hammond, 308 Md. 286, 304, 518 A.2d 1057, 1066 (1987) (finding the
legislature has no “power[] to act arbitrarily or capriciously”); Scholle v. State, 90 Md. 729, 740, 46
A. 326, 327 (1900) (rejecting a discriminatory statute “founded upon no reason having relation to
the subject” (citing State v. Pennoyer, 18 A. 878 (N.H. 1889))).
51. Parrott Complaint, supra note 5, ¶¶ 92–98, 104–08; Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment at 15, Parrott v. Lamone, No. C02-CV-001773 (Md. Cir. Ct. Mar. 25, 2022) [hereinafter Parrott Plaintiffs’ Opposition]
(disagreeing with cases limiting Article III, Section 4 of the Maryland Constitution to General
Assembly districts).
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regard shall be given to natural boundaries and the boundaries of political
subdivisions.”52 The Szeliga plaintiffs, while not directly claiming a violation
of Article III, Section 4, suggested that this provision could serve as a
standard for limiting gerrymandering under other provisions.53 While

52. MD. CONST. art. III, § 4. The districts varied in population by no more than one resident,
avoiding any need to justify a variance. See also infra note 63 and accompanying text (addressing
compactness). Separately, while the allowable population variance for state legislative districts was
not at issue in this case, it has been a matter of significant longstanding controversy. Compare Legis.
Redistricting Cases, 331 Md. 574, 597, 629 A.2d 646, 657 (1993) (establishing a variance up to
10% as essentially a safe harbor), with id. at 632–34, 629 A.2d at 675–76 (Eldridge, J., dissenting)
(“The consistency of application and the neutrality of effect of the nonpopulation criteria must be
considered along with the size of the population disparities in determining whether a state legislative
apportionment plan contravenes the Equal Protection Clause.” (quoting Brown v. Thomson, 462
U.S. 835, 845–46 (1983))), and Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 731 (1983) (arguing that a
variance below 10% is subject to challenge as being made for an illegitimate purpose). The Court
of Appeals did not revisit the issue in 2002. See In re Legis. Districting of the State, 370 Md. 312,
338, 805 A.2d 292, 307 (2002) (citing Legis. Redistricting Cases, 331 Md. at 597, 629 A.2d at 676)
(recounting the Special Master’s review); id. at 338 n.20, 629 A.2d at 307 n.20 (noting that
population issues about the challenged map were moot as the court was ordering the map redrawn
for other reasons).
The issue provoked significant discussion in 2013, after the Special Master applied a
standard that allowed for challenging a variance under 10% upon showing that the variance was
“deliberately created in furtherance of intentional impermissible racial, political, or regional
discrimination . . . .” In re 2012 Legis. Districting of the State, 436 Md. 121, 164, 80 A.3d 1073,
1098 (2013); see also id. at 176, 179, 80 A.3d at 1104, 1106 (applying Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp.
2d 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2004), aff’d, 542 U.S. 947 (2004)). The State objected to the standard as deviating
from the near “safe haven” standard established in 1992, see id. at 165–66, 80 A.3d at 1098–99
(citing Legis. Redistricting Cases, 331 Md. at 594–95, 597, 629 A.2d at 656, 657), and the
challengers there objected to the Special Master’s standard as insufficiently open to challenge, see
id. at 167, 80 A.3d at 1099 (first citing Brown, 462 U.S. at 843–44; and then citing Roman v.
Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 710 (1964)). The Court of Appeals rejected the exceptions of both the State
and the challenger, finding that the challengers met neither the standard adopted by the Court of
Appeals in 1993 used by the Special Master, nor the one the challengers proffered. See id. at 169,
80 A.3d at 1100–01 (citing Legis. Redistricting Cases, 331 Md. at 597, 629 A.2d at 657); id. at 169–
76, 80 A.3d at 1101–05 (comparing the evidence proffered by the challengers there with that
proffered in Larios); id. at 179, 80 A.3d at 1106–07 (quoting Roman, 377 U.S. at 710). However,
the Court of Appeals did not clarify the proper standard for challenging variances under 10% going
forward.
The author respectfully suggests that future challengers must only show that a variance of
“less than 10% reflects the predominance of illegitimate reapportionment factors rather than . . .
legitimate considerations.” Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 578 U.S. 253, 259 (2016)
(internal quotation marks omitted); id. at 264 (citing Cox, 542 U.S. at 949); Raleigh Wake Citizens
Ass’n v. Wake Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 827 F.3d 333, 341–42 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Harris, 578
U.S. at 259, 264). Relatedly, multimember districts are a specific context where the U.S. Supreme
Court has suggested that partisan gerrymandering may violate the federal Equal Protection Clause.
See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973) (“[M]ultimember districts may be vulnerable,
if racial or political groups have been fenced out of the political process and their voting strength
invidiously minimized.”); see also infra note 146 (noting that court-drawn plans should generally
refrain from incorporating multimember districts).
53. Szeliga Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Motion, supra note 50, at 2 (quoting In re Legis.
Districting of State, 299 Md. at 676 n.9, 475 A.2d at 437 n.9).
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accepting that this provision was intended to limit gerrymandering,54 the
defendants contended that the textual reference to “legislative” districts limits
its applicability to districts for the General Assembly, rendering it
inapplicable to congressional districts.55
The court disagreed, and found that legislative districts, as used in
Article III, Section 4, includes congressional districts.56 The court further
found that Article III, Section 4 may serve as a standard to evaluate alleged
violations of Articles 7 and 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights since
each of those provisions “implicate the use of the Section 4 criteria.”57
The court concluded, based largely on trial testimony and exhibits, that
the December 2021 congressional districts violated Article III, Section 4.58
The court found that the districts were contiguous,59 but that they were not
54. Szeliga Memo. in Support of MTD, supra note 28, at 11–13.
55. Id. at 17–18 (citing Olson v. O’Malley, Civ. No. WDQ-12-0240, 2012 WL 764421 (D. Md.
Mar. 6, 2012)).
56. Szeliga v. Lamone, No. C-02-CV-21-001816, at 20 (Md. Cir. Ct. Mar. 25, 2022).
57. Id. at 21; see also id. at 21–23 (explaining the “methodology of drawing a nexus between a
‘standards’ clause and its facilitating constitutional provision” (citing Md. Green Party v. Md. Bd.
of Elections, 377 Md. 127, 832 A.2d 214 (2003))); id. at 23 n.25 (discussing League of Women
Voters of Pennsylvania. v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737 (Pa. 2018), a case that used a similar
nexus to evaluate congressional districts under Pennsylvania’s Constitution and Declaration of
Rights).
58. Id. at 88–93.
59. Id. at 88. But cf. infra note 77 (limiting contiguous General Assembly districts from crossing
the Chesapeake Bay); Elections Reapportionment and Redistricting—General Assembly—A
District Intersected by Navigable Water Does Not Violate the Requirement of Contiguity, 85 Md.
Op. Att’y Gen. 183, 183 (2000) (“[C]ontiguity is not interrupted by navigable water, regardless of
whether the water is spanned by a bridge or tunnel or is crossed by a ferry. However, a district that
crossed the Chesapeake Bay to include portions of its western and eastern shores might be subject
to challenge.”).
The current definitions for contiguity leave room for determining that several of the
December 2021 districts were not of sufficiently adjoining territory to meet the requirement of
Article III, Section 4 of the Maryland Constitution. “The contiguity requirement mandates that there
be no division between one part of a district’s territory and the rest of the district; in other words,
contiguous territory is territory touching, adjoining and connected, as distinguished from territory
separated by other territory.” In re Legis. Districting of State, 299 Md. 658, 675–76, 475 A.2d 428,
437 (1984) (first citing Schneider v. Rockefeller, 293 N.E.2d 67 (N.Y. 1972); and then citing Sherill
v. O’Brien (In re Sherill), 81 N.E. 124 (N.Y. 1907)). The terms “adjoining territory” and
“contiguous territory” have been interpreted as interchangeable. Id. at 674–75, 475 A.2d 436 (citing
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578–79 (1964)); see also Johnson v. State, 366 S.W.3d 11, 31 (Mo.
2012) (“The plain and ordinary meaning of ‘contiguous’ is provided by the dictionary definition of
‘touching or connected throughout.’” (quoting Contiguous, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 492 (1993))). A typical test for such “contiguity requires every part
of a district to be reachable from every other part without leaving the district or crossing its
boundary.” Parella v Montalbano, 899 A.2d 1226, 1253 (R.I. 2006) (citing Hickel v. Se. Conference,
846 P.2d 38, 45 (Alaska 1992)). However, this test may not suffice to confirm compliance with the
definition in In re Legislative Districting of State, where it is met through a feature such as a narrow
orifice or rope that serves no legitimate representational purpose but to enable the district to pass
the travel test. 299 Md. at 675–76, 475 A.2d at 437.
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compact,60 and failed to reflect due regard for the boundaries of political
subdivisions.61
In evaluating compactness, the court’s task was not to apply a geometric
standard, but rather to determine whether the General Assembly “fairly
considered and applied” compactness principles “in light of all of the [other
related] constitutional requirements.”62 To this end, the court highlighted
analysis by the plaintiffs’ expert establishing the December 2021 maps’ poor
scores on four metrics typically used to measure compactness relative to the
scores for earlier Maryland congressional districts as well as those for
districts in other states.63 With respect to the results calculated for each of
those four metrics, the court found it:

“Generally, courts disfavor finding one territory to be contiguous to another territory when
the only link between the two is a narrow corridor. Courts have repeatedly held that when the only
purpose the corridor serves is to create the requisite contiguity, such a subterfuge cannot [prevail].”
Griffin v. City of Robards, 990 S.W.2d 634, 640 (Ky. 1999) (citations omitted) (considering
contiguity in the context of municipal annexation); see also In re Apportionment L. Appearing as
Senate Joint Resol. 1 E, 1982 Special Apportionment Session: Constitutionality Vel Non, 414 So.2d
1040, 1051 (Fla. 1982) (“[L]ands that mutually touch only at a common corner or right angle cannot
be regarded as ‘contiguous’ within the proper meaning of the word when applying it in establishing
house or senate districts.” (emphasis added) (citing Jaffrey v. McGough, 7 So. 333, 334 (Ala.
1890))). But cf. Jaffrey, 7 So. at 334 (describing permissible designs for a homestead stating: “[L]ike
the cloud described by Hamlet to Polonius, it might just as well be ‘in the shape of a camel,’ a
‘weasel,’ or a ‘whale’”). Arguably, from the perspective of a resident in the middle of such a narrow
corridor, that district might better support representation if it were wholly noncontiguous—without
the corridor. In such a district, as with several of the December 2021 districts, there may well be
“division between one part of a district’s territory and the rest of the district; in other words . . .
territory separated by other territory” but for the narrow channel or orifice. In re Legis. Districting
of State, 229 Md. at 675–76, 475 A.2d at 437. “Contiguous” territory excludes “territory [that is
merely] nearby, in the neighborhood or [in the] locality of” other territory of a district. In re Sherrill,
81 N.E. at 131.
Multiple districts in the December 2021 plan comprised territory that was not even close to
being “nearby” or in the “locality of” other territory in the district—and would fall under this
exclusion. In the above cases that apply “contiguity” beyond its dictionary definition, the purpose
of the described shape or area is clearly a factor; such interpretations incorporate both definition
and application. It is not clear whether the interpretation of Judge Battaglia in Szeliga is limited to
geometry, along the lines of Johnson and Parella, or whether it includes contiguity’s
representational purpose, akin to Griffin. The latter is more plausible. See State Bd. of Elections v.
Snyder ex rel. Snyder, 435 Md. 30, 61, 76 A.3d 1110, 1128 (2013) (“[I]n cases involving voting
rights . . . we construe . . . relevant constitutional provisions in relation to their purpose of providing
and encouraging the fair and free exercise of the elective franchise.” (emphasis added) (citing Kemp
v. Owens, 76 Md. 235, 241, 24 A. 606, 608 (1892))). In any event, the author would recommend
that Maryland courts interpret “adjoining territory” consistent with Griffin as quoted above.
60. Szeliga v. Lamone, No. C-02-CV-21-001816, at 88–90 (Md. Cir. Ct. Mar. 25, 2022).
61. Id. at 90–92 (focusing on the high number of splits of counties among districts in the
December 2021 plan).
62. Id. at 88, 89 (quoting In re Legis. Districting of the State, 370 Md. 312, 416, 805 A.2d 292,
353–54 (2002)); see also In re Legis. Districting of the State, 370 Md. at 416, 805 A.2d at 353–54
(citing Legis. Redistricting Cases, 331 Md. 574, 590–91, 629 A.2d 646, 654 (1993)).
63. Szeliga, No. C-02-CV-21-001816, at 89.
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[N]otable that the 2021 Plan reflects compact scores that range
from [(1)] a “limited” number of state maps worse than Maryland,
to [(2)] only six other maps with worse scores, to [(3)] the worst
Inverse Schwartzberg score in the last fifty years in the United
States, to [(4)] “very poorly relative to anything drawn in the last
fifty years in the United States.”64
The court also found it important that among 95,000 maps meeting
comparable constitutional and Voting Rights Act requirements that were
simulated and analyzed by the plaintiffs’ expert, “only one map had a
Gerrymandering Index larger than the 2021 Plan.”65 Accordingly, the court
found that “the notion that the 2021 Plan is compact is empirically
extraordinarily unlikely.”66
The court focused on the division of counties among multiple districts
in evaluating the December 2021 Plan’s regard for political boundaries.67 The
court’s emphasis on the number of these “county splits” reflected the key
roles of counties in Maryland.68 Upon considering that the 2021 Plan resulted
in 17 county splits, compared to 21 such splits in the 2002 and 2011 Plans,69
the court still found that “fracturing counties to the extent accomplished in
the 2021 Plan does not even give lip service to the historical and
constitutional significance of their role in the way Maryland is governed,”70
recalling that the Court of Appeals similarly rejected the General Assembly
districts enacted in 2002 for excessive subdivision crossings.71
While the cases relied upon by the court clearly lay out the significant
roles of Maryland’s counties within the state government,72 many of these

64. Id.
65. Id. Voting Rights Act (“VRA”) districts, intended to elect Representatives to the U.S. House
of Representatives reflecting the choice of minority voters, have been particularly subject to such
abuse, such as where “ropes” connect the bulk of such districts with distant Republican areas
intended to be an impotent minority of those districts. See Senate Floor Actions (3/29/2022), MD.
SENATE, at 47:50–48:10 (Mar. 29, 2022) (statement of Sen. Robert G. Cassilly),
https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/FloorActions/Media/senate-56- (“[The Voting Rights
Act] was never intended as a sword to allow the majority party to use that as a subterfuge to deprive
the minority party of a fair say in democracy.”).
66. Szeliga, No. C-02-CV-21-001816, at 90.
67. Id. at 90–92.
68. Id. at 90–91 (first quoting Md. Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes (Tawes II), 229
Md. 406, 411–12, 184 A.2d 715, 717–18 (1962); and then quoting Legis. Redistricting Cases, 331
Md. 574, 620–21, 629 A.2d 646, 669–70 (1993) (Eldridge, J., dissenting)).
69. Id. at 90.
70. Id. at 91.
71. See id. at 91–92 (quoting In re Legis. Districting of the State, 370 Md. 312, 368, 805 A.2d
292, 325–26 (2002)).
72. Id. at 90–91 (first quoting Md. Comm. for Fair Representation, 229 Md. at 411–12, 184
A.2d at 717–18; and then quoting Legis. Redistricting Cases, 331 Md. at 620–21, 629 A.2d at 669–
70 (Eldridge, J., dissenting)).
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roles are less relevant or inapplicable to the federal government.73 Further,
the equal population requirement applies much more strictly to the larger
congressional districts than to the smaller state legislative districts that may
have a variance up to 10 percent.74 Thus, the extent of the “regard” that is
“due” to avoid crossing county boundaries in the course of drawing
congressional districts ought to be somewhat less than the extent that is “due”
for drawing state legislative districts.75
Similarly, with respect to natural boundaries,76 the greater size of
congressional districts augurs for greater latitude in crossing natural
boundaries—particularly the Chesapeake Bay.77 Since the Eastern Shore
counties together do not contain a sufficient number of residents for a
congressional district,78 the remaining population for that district must come
from the Western Shore—from among counties north of the bay, those west
of the Bay Bridge, or both.79 Article III, Section 4 should not be read so
narrowly as to limit this choice to the northern counties.

73. E.g., id. at 90 (“[The counties] have traditionally exercised wide governmental powers in
the fields of education, welfare, police, taxation, roads, sanitation, health and the administration of
justice, with a minimum of supervision by the State.” (quoting Md. Comm. for Fair Representation,
229 Md. at 411–12, 184 A.2d at 717–18)); id. at 91 (“Maryland government is organized on a
county-by-county basis. Numerous services and responsibilities are now, and historically have been,
organized at the county level. . . . [Further,] many of the laws enacted by the General Assembly
each year are public local laws, applicable to particular counties.” (quoting Legis. Redistricting
Cases, 331 Md. at 620–21, 629 A.2d at 669–70)).
74. See also supra note 52 (discussing the variance for state legislative districts). Compare
Tennant v. Jefferson Cnty. Comm’n, 567 U.S. 758, 762–65 (2012) (allowing a 0.79% variance
among congressional districts to avoid splitting a county), with Legis. Redistricting Cases, 331 Md.
at 597, 629 A.2d at 657 (allowing up to a 10% variance among state legislative districts as “prima
facie immaterial”).
75. Even so, the author takes no issue with the court’s finding that the county splits among the
December 2021 districts reflected insufficient regard for the boundaries of political subdivisions.
76. The court made no finding as to the sufficiency of regard for natural boundaries.
77. But cf. In re Legis. Districting of the State, 370 Md. 312, 343–44, 805 A.2d 292, 310 (2002)
(reviewing the debates on the development of Article III, Section 4 of the Maryland Constitution
that settled on an interpretation of “contiguous” that would exclude a Senate or Delegate district
crossing the Chesapeake Bay).
78. See “Congressional District 01” in 2022 Maryland Congressional Districts, MD. DEP’T OF
PLANNING, https://planning.maryland.gov/Redistricting/Pages/2020/congDist.aspx (last visited
Aug. 9, 2022).
79. See id. (showing that all of Harford County and part of Baltimore County, containing 55,051
residents, were combined with the Eastern Shore counties to form a full congressional district).
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C. Article 7 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights
Both the Szeliga and the Parrott plaintiffs claimed that the December
2021 congressional districts violated Article 7 of the Maryland Declaration
of Rights.80 Article 7 provides:
That the right of the People to participate in the Legislature is the
best security of liberty and the foundation of all free Government;
for this purpose, elections ought to be free and frequent; and every
citizen having the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution,
ought to have the right of suffrage.81
The Szeliga plaintiffs argued that:
Article 7 . . . provides the citizens of Maryland . . . with a right to
an equally effective power to select the congressional
representative of their choice, and bars the State from creating
congressional districts that ensure the election of candidates from
one political party and/or diluting the votes of citizens on the basis
of political affiliation and viewpoint.82
They further argued that Article 7 should be read to prohibit partisan
gerrymandering in light of the Court of Appeals’ direction that “[h]owever
ambiguously or obscurely statutes or constitutions may be phrased, it would
not be just to give them a construction in hostility to the principles on which
free governments are founded.”83 They also noted that the Supreme Courts
of Pennsylvania and North Carolina have recently interpreted similar
provisions of their states constitutions to prohibit partisan gerrymandering,84
with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania confirming injury to both the right
of free elections and the right of suffrage.85 Lastly, the Szeliga Plaintiffs
argued that by predetermining the election outcomes through district designs,
80. Szeliga Complaint, supra note 5, ¶¶ 59–64; Parrott Complaint, supra note 5, ¶¶ 86–91, 99–
103.
81. MD. CONST. Declaration of Rts., art. 7 (emphasis added).
82. Szeliga Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 62.
83. Szeliga Plaintiffs’ Opposition, supra note 24, at 15 (emphasis omitted) (quoting State Bd.
of Elections v. Snyder ex rel. Snyder, 435 Md. 30, 61, 76 A.3d 1110, 1128 (2013)).
84. Id. at 13 (first citing League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 821
(Pa. 2018) (“[T]he 2011 Plan subordinates the traditional redistricting criteria in service of achieving
unfair partisan advantage, and, thus, violates the Free and Equal Elections Clause of the
Pennsylvania Constitution.”); and then citing Harper v. Hall, 867 S.E.2d 554, 556 (N.C. 2022)
(“[C]laims asserting that congressional . . . districting plans enacted by the General Assembly are
unlawful partisan gerrymanders that violate the free elections clause, the equal protection clause,
the free speech clause, and the freedom of assembly clause of the Declaration of Rights . . . of the
North Carolina Constitution are . . . justiciable in North Carolina courts.”).
85. Id. at 14 (“[S]ophisticated gerrymandering and partisan dilution of votes is not ‘free and
equal,’ . . . [but] in fact . . . ‘prevent[s] the free exercise of the right of suffrage.’” (quoting League
of Women Voters, 178 A.3d at 821)). On February 14, 2022, the Supreme Court of North Carolina
issued its opinion in Harper v. Hall, 868 S.E.2d 499 (N.C. 2022), cert. granted sub nom, Moore v.
Harper, No. 21-1271 (U.S. June 30, 2022).
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the December 2021 districts violated Article 7 by effectively limiting their
choices in voting for congressional candidates.86
The Parrott plaintiffs also relied on State Board of Elections v. Snyder
ex rel. Snyder87: “[A]s made clear by Article 7 . . . the [right to vote] is one
of, if not, the most important and fundamental right[s] granted to Maryland
citizens . . . .”88 They also quoted the earlier (1892) appearance of the same
language the Szeliga plaintiffs quoted from Snyder,89 and similarly discussed
the recent cases in Pennsylvania and North Carolina.90
The Defendants argued that Article 7 does not apply to congressional
elections,91 and that it does not, in any event, afford protection against
partisan gerrymandering.92
The court rejected the defendants’ contention that Article 7 was limited
in scope to elections for the General Assembly,93 and found that the plaintiffs
had stated a claim under Article 7.94 The court found that the evidence at trial
“proved that the 2021 Plan was drawn with ‘partisanship as a predominant
intent, to the exclusion of traditional redistricting criteria,’ accomplished by
the party in power, to suppress the voice of Republican voters,”95 and thus it
violated Article 7 “in its own right and as a nexus to the standards of Article
III, Section 4.”96
D. Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights
The Szeliga plaintiffs claimed that the December 2021 districts violated
Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights “by diluting the weight of
86. Szeliga Plaintiffs’ Opposition, supra note 24, at 17 (citing Munsell v. Hennegan, 182 Md.
15, 22, 31 A.2d 640, 643–44 (1943)).
87. 435 Md. 30, 76 A.3d 1110 (2013).
88. Parrott Plaintiffs’ Opposition, supra note 51, at 7–8 (alteration in original) (internal
quotations omitted) (quoting Snyder, 435 Md. at 61, 76 A.3d 1110, 1128 (2013)).
89. Id. at 8 (quoting Kemp v. Owens, 76 Md. 235, 241, 24 A. 606, 608 (1892) (Bryan, J.,
concurring)).
90. Id. at 9–10 (first citing League of Women Voters, 178 A.3d at 804; and then citing Harper,
867 S.E.2d at 557).
91. Szeliga Memo. in Support of MTD, supra note 28, at 24–27 (construing the text of Article
7 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights).
92. Id. at 27–30 (first citing Burruss v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Frederick Cnty., 427 Md. 231,
264, 46 A.3d 1182, 1201 (2012) (providing the process for analyzing constitutional challenges in
the elections context); and then citing Suessman v. Lamone, 383 Md. 697, 731–33, 862 A.2d 1, 21–
22 (2004) (holding that Article 7 does not protect the right of unaffiliated voters to vote in party
primary elections)).
93. Szeliga v. Lamone, No. C-02-CV-21-001816, at 25 (Md. Cir. Ct. Mar. 25, 2022).
94. Id. at 27–28 (first citing Jackson v. Norris, 173 Md. 579, 596, 603, 195 A. 576, 584–85,
588 (1937); and then citing Md. Green Party v. Md. Bd. of Elections, 377 Md. 127, 150, 832 A.2d
214, 227–28 (2003)).
95. Id. at 93.
96. Id.
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their votes based on party affiliation and depriving them of the opportunity
for full and effective participation in the election of their congressional
representatives.”97 Article 24 provides “[t]hat no man ought to be taken or
imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed,
or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or
property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land.”98
The Szeliga plaintiffs noted that Article 24 has been held to incorporate
the right of Equal Protection.99 However, a Maryland constitutional provision
may not “always be interpreted or applied in the same manner as its federal
counterpart,”100 and “a discriminatory classification may be an
unconstitutional breach of the equal protection doctrine under the authority
of Article 24 alone.”101 Therefore, Maryland courts are “not bound to follow
the Supreme Court’s conclusion regarding the justiciability of equal
protection and free speech challenges to partisan gerrymandering in federal
courts” when interpreting and applying the Maryland counterparts.102
97. Szaliga Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 72. The Parrott Plaintiffs did not raise a claim under
Article 24.
98. MD. CONST. Decl. of Rts., art. 24.
99. See Szeliga Plaintiffs’ Opposition, supra note 24, at 20 n.6 (citing Md. Green Party, 377
Md. at 157, 832 A.2d at 231–32).
100. Id. at 21 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Dua v. Comcast Cable of Md., Inc., 370 Md. 604,
621, 805 A.2d 1061, 1071 (2002)).
101. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Md. Green Party, 377 Md. at 158, 832 A.2d at
231); see also id. (quoting Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 430 Md. 535, 550, 62 A.3d
123, 131–32 (2013)).
102. Id. at 22 (referring to the Supreme Court’s holding in Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct.
2484, 2506–07 (2019)). Unlike the Supreme Court’s interpretation of provisions of the U.S.
Constitution, it is arguable that Maryland courts are not bound to follow the Supreme Court’s
justiciability holdings with respect to those federal provisions; an interpretation by a Maryland court
would not conflict with a U.S. Supreme Court interpretation where the Supreme Court has declined
to provide one. See Scott Dodson, Article III and the Political Question Doctrine, 116 NW. U. L.
REV. 681, 704 n.161 (2021) (“As matters stand, state courts may determine federal constitutional
questions even though Supreme Court review is blocked on such justiciability grounds as lack of
standing, mootness, or political question doctrine.” (quoting 16B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4015 (3d ed.
2019))). But see John Harrison, The Political Question Doctrines, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 457, 493 (2017)
(“Because [the Supreme Court’s political question] doctrine is one of federal law, state courts are
required to apply it.”); but cf. id. at 497 n.205 (“[S]tate courts are not bound by . . . federal rules of
justiciability even when they . . . are called upon to interpret the Constitution . . . .” (quoting
ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989))). While this quote from ASARCO suggests that
state courts might not be bound to follow the Supreme Court’s political question determinations,
Professor Harrison noted that “[t]he ASARCO Court had no occasion to consider whether any federal
non-jurisdictional principles of justiciability might apply in state court.” Id.; cf. Elizabeth Earle
Beske, Political Question Disconnects, 67 AM. U. L. REV. F. 35, 45 (2018) (“[T]his Court, of course,
may not prohibit state courts from deciding political questions, any more than it may prohibit them
from deciding questions that are moot . . . .” (quoting Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1005 n.2
(1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment))). Professor Beske then noted that some states
derive their own political question doctrines from their own constitutions, of which several,
including Maryland, apply the federal standards set in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). See
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The defendants countered that Rucho precludes Maryland courts from
evaluating political gerrymanders under Article 24 since the Supreme Court,
in evaluating the Equal Protection Claim in Rucho, rejected the test proposed
there and stated that “securing partisan advantage” is “permissible” and thus
it “does not become constitutionally impermissible, like racial
discrimination, when that permissible intent ‘predominates.’”103 The
id. at 45 n.93 (citing Smigiel v. Franchot, 410 Md. 302, 324–25, 978 A.2d 687, 701 (2009)). A
Maryland court could still apply a provision of the U.S. Constitution on the merits, even after the
Supreme Court declines to do so for lack of standards, if the Maryland court identifies a suitable
standard that was not explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court. In some instances, the Maryland
court may have such standards available from the Maryland Constitution. See supra notes 48, 50,
54, and 57 and accompanying text.
Two further issues may limit the practical justiciability of questions that may be deemed
political for lack of standards under federal law, but perhaps not under Maryland law: One is the
prospective removal of such claims to federal court, and the other is the availability of judicial
remedies under Maryland law. A defendant may remove a civil action filed in a Maryland court to
the federal district court if the federal court has “original jurisdiction” of the matter. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441. As relevant here, the federal district courts have such jurisdiction “of all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. If a federal district
court retains “original jurisdiction” of a civil action that poses a nonjusticiable political question
under federal law, despite not having “jurisdiction” to decide the question, then the action would
likely be removed—and then promptly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. While it seems
counterintuitive that a federal court might hold jurisdiction only for the purpose of dismissing such
an action, it is not at all clear whether the lack of jurisdiction to decide a political question also
deprives a federal district court of “original jurisdiction,” thus precluding removal. See Harrison,
supra (asserting that lack of jurisdiction to decide a political question does not defeat subject matter
jurisdiction); Dodson, supra (suggesting that political question doctrine should be detached from
Article III); see also Harrison, supra, at 490 (implying that courts should dismiss political questions
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), rather than to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (citing Mass. State Grange v. Benton, 272
U.S. 525, 528 (1926))); cf. Dodson, supra, at 735 (suggesting that a state law claim that is justiciable
under state law would be dismissed if removed to federal court and found nonjusticiable under
federal law). But see Harrison, supra, at 509 n.244 (allowing for instances where the presence of a
political question may defeat standing, and thus subject matter jurisdiction); Beske, supra, at 45–46
(noting the “disconnect” unearthed by Professor Harrison as to what the Supreme Court has said
and done on the issue); Dodson, supra, at 703 (distinguishing nonjusticiable cases, including Rucho,
that have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction); Richard H. Fallon Jr., Political Questions and the
Ultra Vires Conundrum, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 1481, 1494 (2020) (noting “misconceptions that have
grown up around the Supreme Court’s insistence that political question determinations are
jurisdictional”). Following on these professors’ observations, the federal courts, including the
Supreme Court, might also see an incentive to dismiss partisan gerrymandering challenges for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction in order to avoid mandatory review of substantial claims by threejudge district courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2284; Shapiro v. McManus, 577 U.S. 39 (2015) (holding that
a single-judge district court may not dismiss an action falling under 28 U.S.C. § 2284 for failure to
state a claim; author was the lead petitioner in this case). See infra Part II on the availability of
remedies under Maryland law.
103. Szeliga Memo. in Support of MTD, supra note 28, at 39–40 (citing Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at
2502–03). The Court of Appeals’ allowance for partisan advantage in In re Legislative Districting
is perhaps more relevant to the applicability of Article 24, a Maryland constitutional provision, than
is Rucho. See In re Legis. Districting of the State, 370 Md. 312, 321–22, 805 A.2d 292, 297 (2002)
(citing MD. CONST. art. III, § 4) (“That [a legislative district map] may have been formulated in an
attempt to . . . help or injure incumbents or political parties . . . will not affect its validity.”). But
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defendants further argued that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
federal Equal Protection Clause in the context of partisan gerrymandering
should guide the interpretation of Article 24.104
The court disagreed that the protections of Article 24 are limited to those
of the federal Equal Protection Clause.105 The court further found that it could
enforce those protections in the gerrymandering context through standards
supplied from other constitutional provisions,106 as well as by applying strict
scrutiny to impermissible disparate treatment.107 The court went on to find
that testimony at trial established “that Republican voters and candidates
[were] substantially adversely impacted by the [December] 2021 Plan,”108
and that the defendants failed to provide “a ‘compelling state interest’ to
rationalize the adverse effect.”109
E. Article 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights
The second clause of Article 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights
provides for the freedom of speech, similar to the First Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution. Article 40 provides “[t]hat the liberty of the press ought to
be inviolably preserved; that every citizen of the State ought to be allowed to
speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for
the abuse of that privilege.”110 The Szeliga plaintiffs claimed that the
December 2021 districts violated their Article 40 rights by benefiting
Democratic voters and burdening them and other Republican voters because
of their voting history, party affiliation, and expression of their political

while several plaintiffs there raised claims under Article 24, see 370 Md. at 330, 331, 334, app. at
401, 445, 805 A.2d 302, 303, 304–05, app. at 345, 370–71, neither the Special Master nor the Court
of Appeals provided an analysis of them, see 370 Md. at 337 n.18, app. at 445–46, 805 A.2d 306
n.18, app. at 371.
104. Szeliga Memo. in Support of MTD, supra note 28, at 41 (citing Hornbeck v. Somerset Cnty.
Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 640, 458 A.2d 758, 780–81 (1983)).
105. Szeliga v. Lamone, No. C-02-CV-21-001816, at 30 (Md. Cir. Ct. Mar. 25, 2022) (citing
Att’y Gen. of Md. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 704, 715, 426 A.2d 929, 941, 947 (1981)); id. at 30
(citing Md. Aggregates Ass’n v. State, 337 Md. 658, 671 n.8, 655 A.2d 886, 893 n.8 (1995)).
106. Id. at 33–34 (quoting Md. Green Party v. Md. Bd. of Elections, 377 Md. 127, 143, 832 A.2d
214, 223 (2003)); see also supra Section I.B.
107. Id. at 34 (citing Md. Green Party, 377 Md. at 152–53, 156–57, 159, 163, 832 A.2d at 228–
29, 231–32, 232–33, 235). “When the State’s classification is asserted to infringe on a fundamental
right or interest, the Court should analyze the matter according to a ‘strict scrutiny’ standard. In
order for a statute or regulation to withstand equal protection scrutiny under the strict scrutiny
standard, the State must show that the law is ‘necessary to promote a compelling governmental
interest.’” Md. Green Party, 377 Md. at 165–66, 832 A.2d at 236–37 (Harrell, J., concurring)
(citations omitted) (quoting Waldron, 289 Md. at 705–06, 706, 426 A.2d at 941, 941–42).
108. Szeliga, No. C-02-CV-21-001816, at 93.
109. Id.
110. MD. CONST. Decl. of Rts., art. 40.
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views.111 They further claimed that this treatment was not only discriminatory
but also retaliatory—intentionally punishing them and other Republicans on
account of their votes and protected political speech.112 The Szeliga plantiffs’
arguments using the free speech provisions of Article 40 paralleled their
points on equal protection.113
The defendants argued that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Rucho
precluded the plaintiffs’ Article 40 claim.114 They noted that the Supreme
Court in Rucho found that the challenged maps there imposed “no restrictions
on speech, association, or any other First Amendment activities.”115 That
Court rejected the tests used by the lower courts because “if any ‘intent’ to
burden individuals based on their voting history or party affiliation were
sufficient to meet the first prong, then ‘any level of partisanship in districting
would constitute an infringement of their First Amendment rights.’” 116
Defendants further argued that “[a]lthough the Court of Appeals ‘has
sometimes held out the possibility that Article 40 could be construed
differently from the First Amendment in some circumstances, the Court has
generally regarded the protections afforded by Article 40 as “coextensive”
with those under the First Amendment.’”117
The court sided with the Szeliga plaintiffs, and found that the map
impermissibly discriminated against them for their political views—using an
analysis similar to that of Chief Justice Rehnquist in his concurrence in
Gralike. The court noted that the Court of Appeals does not always interpret
and apply Article 40 identically to how the Supreme Court interprets and
applies the First Amendment,118 and that the Court of Appeals departs from
federal interpretations as needed to ensure that rights under the Maryland
counterpart provisions “are fully protected.”119 The court found that the
specific rights alleged to be infringed were “fundamental,” thus making any
111. Szeliga Complaint, supra note 5, ¶¶ 79, 80. The Parrott Plaintiffs did not raise a claim under
Article 40. See also Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 531–32 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in
judgment) (finding that the ballot language disfavoring Gralike violated the First Amendment as it
“discriminates on the basis of viewpoint because only those candidates who fail to conform to the
State's position receive derogatory labels”).
112. Id. ¶ 81.
113. See Szeliga Plaintiffs’ Opposition, supra note 24, at 20–24; see also supra notes 99–102
and accompanying text.
114. Szeliga Memo. in Support of MTD, supra note 28, at 40 (citing Rucho v. Common Cause,
139 S. Ct. 2484, 2504–05 (2019)).
115. Id. (quoting Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2504).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 41 (quoting Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Dir., Dep’t of Fin. of Balt. City, 472 Md.
444, 457, 247 A.3d 740, 747 (2021)).
118. Szeliga v. Lamone, No. C-02-CV-21-001816, at 37 (Md. Cir. Ct. Mar. 25, 2022) (quoting
State v. Brookins, 380 Md. 345, 350 n.2, 844 A.2d 1162, 1165 n.2 (2004)).
119. Id. at 37–38 (quoting Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 430 Md. 535, 550, 62
A.3d 123, 132 (2013)).
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proven infringement subject to strict scrutiny.120 Upon considering the
evidence offered at trial, the court concluded that:
In many respects, all of the testimony in this case supports the
notions that the voice of Republican voters was diluted and their
right to vote and be heard with the efficacy of a Democratic voter
was diminished. No compelling reason for the dilution and
diminution was ever adduced by the State.121
The court summarized its conclusions by declaring that “[t]he
[December] 2021 Congressional Plan is unconstitutional, and subverts that
will of those governed.”122 The court adjudged the December 2021 plan to be
“in violation of the Maryland Constitution and Declaration of Rights” as it
was “not consistent” with Article III, Section 4 of the Maryland Constitution,
and “violative” of Articles 7, 24, and 40 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights.123 Accordingly, the court enjoined the use of the December 2021
districts for any election, and remanded the December 2021 Plan “to the
General Assembly to develop a new Congressional Plan that comports with
Article III, Section 4 of the Maryland Constitution and the Voting Rights
Act” within five days.124
II. REMEDIATING THE DECEMBER 2021 MAP
Section II.A. of this Part discusses the General Assembly’s enactment
of a new map to comply with the trial court’s order, and the parties’
acceptance of the new map and their agreement to drop the appeal and crossappeal from the trial court’s judgment. Section II.B. discusses the
hypothetical situation that might have arisen had the General Assembly not
opted not to timely comply with the trial court’s order and produce a
compliant map. Unlike a federal district court, which has well-settled
authority to remediate an impermissible map as a matter of last resort before
an imminent election, it is less clear whether Maryland trial or appellate
courts hold similar authority. Where a Maryland court does not have or
otherwise declines to exercise such authority, remediation of a map that is
found impermissible under Maryland law could well fall to the federal courts.

120. Id. at 38 (citing Hornbeck v. Somerset Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 641, 458 A.2d
758, 781 (1983)).
121. Id. at 93–94.
122. Id. at 94.
123. Szeliga Declaratory Judgment, supra note 7, at 2–3.
124. Id. at 3.
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A. The April 2022 Map
After the court issued its order directing the General Assembly to enact
a remedial map within five days, the General Assembly met that deadline and
enacted a new map on March 30, 2022.125 However, the State defendants filed
Notices of Appeal,126 and the bill enacting the new map stated that “[i]f the
Circuit Court’s judgment that [the December 2021 plan] is unconstitutional
is not upheld on appeal, or if the appeal is not otherwise dismissed, then this
Act shall be void and of no further effect.”127 The parties entered into
negotiations and reached agreement among themselves and with the
Governor. The appeals were dismissed, and with that contingency removed,
the Governor signed the legislation enacting the April 2022 map into law.128
Maryland’s 2022 congressional elections are now being conducted with
districts under the April 2022 Plan that are noticeably more compact and
contiguous than those under the short-lived December 2021 Plan.129
125. See
SB
1012,
MD. GEN. ASSEMB. (July
8,
2022,
3:11
PM),
https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Legislation/Details/Sb1012; see also supra note 8.
126. See Order, Lamone v. Szeliga, Case No. COA-REG-0065-2021 (Md. Apr. 1, 2022),
https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/import/coappeals/highlightedcases/lamone/20220401order.
pdf. The Szeliga Plaintiffs filed cross-appeals. See id. The parties filed notices in both the Maryland
Court of Appeals and the Maryland Court of Special Appeals in light of uncertainty as to which
court had appellate jurisdiction from the Circuit Court of Maryland for Anne Arundel County. The
Memorandum Opinion and Order stated that an appeal from the Circuit Court would be taken
directly to the Court of Appeals under Section 12-203 of the Election Law Article. Szeliga v.
Lamone, No. C-02-CV-21-001816, at 1–2 n.2 (Md. Cir. Ct. Mar. 25, 2022). Section 12-203(a)(3)
of the Election Law Article requires such appeals to be taken within five days of a circuit court’s
decision. See MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 12-203(a)(3) (2022). However, Title 12 is titled
“Contested Elections” and Subtitle 2, “Judicial Review of Elections,” “applies to an issue arising in
an election conducted under this article.” Id. § 12-201. Thus, there was uncertainty as to whether
Section 12-203 was applicable, and so the parties filed appeals in both the Court of Appeals and the
Court of Special Appeals to be certain of having filed in the right court. See Order, Szeliga, Case
No. COA-REG-0065-2021. The Court of Appeals removed any uncertainty by exercising its
discretion to take an appeal directly, see MD. R. 8-301(a)(4), and set the matter for briefing and
argument on April 12, 2022. See Order at 3, Szeliga, Case No. COA-REG-0065-2021.
127. Congressional Districting Plan, 2022 Md. Laws, ch. 16, § 4 (2022).
128. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
129. Interestingly, while the April 2022 maps are far more rational from a geographic
perspective, the partisan make-up of the districts did not change significantly. Compare infra
Figure 1 (map for the December 2021 Plan), and Figure 2 (partisan and racial data for the December
2021 Plan), with infra Figure 3 (map for the April 2022 Plan), and Figure 4 (partisan and racial data
for the April 2022 Plan). The Sixth District is now nearly evenly split, and the First District is more
firmly Republican than in the December 2021 Plan, with the partisan make-up of the remaining
districts largely unchanged. While Republican members of the General Assembly still criticized the
April 2022 districts as a partisan gerrymander, they appear to meet the Article III, Section 4 standard
set out by the court, even though the court declined to approve the April 2022 Plan since the
Governor had not yet signed into law at the time of the court’s review. See Order, Szeliga, No. C02-CV-21-001816 (issuing an order on April 1, 2022, denying approval of the April 2022 Plan to
avoid issuing an advisory opinion); see also ‘Tremendous Victory’, supra note 9. The Szeliga
plaintiffs did raise an objection to the Second District crossing into Baltimore City at the April 1,
2022, hearing noted in the Order. See Order, Szeliga, No. C-02-CV-21-001816.
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B. If the General Assembly Had Not Enacted the April 2022 Map: The
Authority of Maryland Courts to Draw a Remedial Congressional
Map
Fortunately, the General Assembly complied with the court’s order. But
what if the General Assembly had not timely complied?
It is well-settled that a federal district court has authority to fix a
congressional map that is defective under federal law, and the U.S. Supreme
Court has provided those courts guidance on how to complete this task.130
The author filed an amicus curiae brief to provide the court with prospective
maps for replacing the December 2021 Plan consistent with this guidance in
Perry v. Perez.131 But on the first day of trial, the court stated that she did not
have authority to impose a remedial map under Maryland law.132
Maryland’s precedents on judicial authority to remedy an
unconstitutional redistricting map are in the context of General Assembly
districts.133
Upon petition of any registered voter, the Court of Appeals shall have
original jurisdiction to review the legislative districting of the State and may
grant appropriate relief, if it finds that the districting of the State is not

130. See, e.g., Perry v. Perez, 565 U.S. 388, 393 (2012) (“‘[F]aced with the necessity of drawing
district lines by judicial order, a court, as a general rule, should be guided by the legislative policies
underlying’ a state plan—even one that was itself unenforceable—‘to the extent those policies do
not lead to violations of the Constitution or the Voting Rights Act.’” (quoting Abrams v. Johnson,
521 U.S. 74, 79 (1997))); id. at 394 (“[T]he [enacted] state plan serves as a starting point for the
district court. It provides important guidance that helps ensure that the district court appropriately
confines itself to drawing interim maps that comply with the Constitution and the Voting Rights
Act, without displacing legitimate state policy judgments with the court’s own preferences.”).
131. 565 U.S. 388, 393 (2012); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Stephen M. Shapiro, Szeliga,
No. C-02-CV-21-001816 (Md. Cir. Ct. Mar. 25, 2022). The options provided in that brief
“uncracked” plaintiffs who were “cracked” in their December 2021 districts. Unfortunately, the
author did not specifically design those options to comply with Article III, Section 4 of the Maryland
Constitution, as the court had not yet established those provisions as the standard marking the outer
bounds of permissible gerrymandering. Even so, it is interesting that several of the districts in those
options bear a striking resemblance to the districts enacted three weeks later in the April 2022 Plan.
132. The court referred to an earlier discussion of this authority in a matter decided while she
was sitting on the Court of Appeals. It might well have been Getty v. Carroll County Board of
Elections, 399 Md. 710, 741, 926 A.2d 216, 235 (2007) (holding that a trial court could not draw a
county’s initial county commission districts, even upon the legislature’s failure to do so). See infra
notes 154–159 discussing Getty. Judge Battaglia also sat on the Court of Appeals when it decided
legislative redistricting cases in 2013 and 2002. See infra note 133 (citing those cases).
133. See In re 2012 Legis. Districting of the State, 436 Md. 121, 80 A.3d 1073 (2013); In re
Legis. Districting of the State, 370 Md. 312, 805 A.2d 292 (2002); Legis. Redistricting Cases, 331
Md. 574, 629 A.2d 646 (1993); In re Legis. Districting of State, 299 Md. 658, 475 A.2d 428 (1984);
In re Legis. Districting of the State, 271 Md. 320, 317 A.2d 477 (1974); Md. Comm. for Fair
Representation v. Tawes (Tawes II), 229 Md. 406, 184 A.2d 715 (1962), rev’d 377 U.S. 656 (1964);
Md. Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes (Tawes I), 228 Md. 412, 180 A.2d 656 (1962). See
also supra note 132 on circuit court authority to draw an initial set of local districts.
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consistent with requirements of either the Constitution of the United States
of America, or the Constitution of Maryland.134
The Court of Appeals in Maryland Committee for Fair Representation
v. Tawes (Tawes I)135 decided that the Circuit Court of Maryland for Anne
Arundel County should hear a challenge to the General Assembly’s countybased representation, as provided by the 1867 Maryland Constitution, in the
wake of Baker v. Carr.136 As relevant here, the Court of Appeals determined
that the malapportionment challenge there was justiciable,137 and that the
circuit court could declare the then-existing constitutional provisions on
apportionment unconstitutional under the federal Fourteenth Amendment
and enjoin their further use,138 but that the circuit court had no power to direct
the General Assembly to enact a new apportionment provision.139 Despite
Baker, the dissent found the matter nonjusticiable in Maryland courts,
arguing that Maryland courts lack jurisdiction in light of Article 8 of the
Declaration of Rights and the “wider” “rule of judicial abstention.”140
Article 8 provides “[t]hat the Legislative, Executive and Judicial powers of
Government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other; and
no person exercising the functions of one of said Departments shall assume
or discharge the duties of any other.”141
The Court of Appeals has subsequently struck down enacted General
Assembly redistricting plans and imposed remedial plans in 1974 and
2002.142 Upon finding that the Governor failed to hold required public

134. MD. CONST. art. III, § 5; cf. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 1-501 (jurisdiction of
Circuit Courts).
135. 228 Md. 412, 180 A.2d 656 (1962).
136. See id. at 418–19, 180 A.2d at 659 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)); id. at 436,
180 A.2d at 669 (remanding the case to the circuit court, sitting in equity, for trial); Tawes II, 229
Md. at 409–10, 184 A.2d at 716 (summarizing prior case history). Maryland’s current constitutional
provisions on legislative redistricting and judicial review thereof in Article III, Section 5 were
established after this case. The circuit court oversaw a limited transition of the House of Delegates
to population-based representation, but declined to impose such changes for the Maryland Senate.
See id. at 410, 416, 184 A.2d at 717, 720. A divided Court of Appeals affirmed, see id. at 417, 184
A.2d at 721; id. at 422, 184 A.2d at 723–24 (Brune, C.J., dissenting), but the U.S. Supreme Court
reversed. See Md. Comm. for Fair Representation, 377 U.S. at 676 (reaffirming that both houses of
a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned by population).
137. Tawes I, 228 Md. at 433, 180 A.2d at 667.
138. Id. at 437, 440, 180 A.2d at 669–71.
139. Id. at 440, 180 A.2d at 671.
140. Id. at 446, 180 A.2d at 674–75 (Henderson, J., dissenting). Judge Henderson also noted that
under applicable English common law, “judges do not make law but discover it,” explaining that
interpretations must therefore relate back to when the interpreted provision was written. Id. at 444,
180 A.2d at 673 (citing MD. CONST. Decl. of Rts., art. 5).
141. MD. CONST. Decl. of Rts., art. 8.
142. See generally In re Legis. Districting of the State, 271 Md. 320, 317 A.2d 477 (1974); In re
Legis. Districting of the State, 370 Md. 312, 805 A.2d 292 (2002).
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hearings prior to issuing his 1973 Plan,143 the Court of Appeals, using the
Governor’s Plan as a starting point, directed a Special Master to suggest
modifications to the Plan indicated from consideration of public comments
and challenges to the Plan.144 In 2002, the Court of Appeals found that the
Governor’s Plan failed to comply with Article III, Section 4 of the Maryland
Constitution,145 and, starting from a clean slate, directed its technical
consultants
to prepare a plan that, without regard to political considerations,
complied with federal law, including the Voting Rights Act, and
met the Maryland constitutional requirements of substantial
equality of population, compactness, and contiguity, and contained
as few breaches of natural and political subdivision boundaries as
possible. Of particular consequence to our disregard of political
considerations, we directed that the portion of the redistricting
software program that identified the location of the residences of
incumbent state legislators be disabled for purposes of the Court’s
work in developing a constitutional plan.146
While the Court of Appeals meant well when it declared that it “may
not take into account the same political considerations as the Governor and
the Legislature,”147 I would agree with Judge Raker that “[t]he decision not
to consider incumbency, regionalism, or communities of interest [was] itself
a political decision.”148 The revisions made by the Court of Appeals had the
143. In re Legis. Districting of the State, 271 Md. at 322, 317 A.2d at 478.
144. Id. at 322–23, 317 A.2d at 478–79. The Special Master also invited exceptions and held a
hearing on his preliminary recommendations before submitting a Final Report. Id. at 323, 317 A.2d
at 479.
145. In re Legis. Districting of the State, 370 Md. at 318, 805 A.2d at 295.
146. Id. at 319 n.2, 805 A.2d at 295 n.2 (emphasis added); id. at 323, 805 A.2d at 298. The Court
of Appeals should have also directed the consultants to avoid multimember districts except where
the Court might have found them particularly warranted. See Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 415
(1977) (requiring a court to “articulate a ‘singular combination of unique factors’ that justifies”
multimember districts in a court-drawn map (quoting Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 333 (1973))).
The 2002 court-revised map left the sitting Speaker of the Maryland House of Delegates with a far
less politically-viable district, a major factor in his defeat at the next election. See 2002
Gubernatorial Election, MD. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS (Dec. 2, 2002, 2:24 PM),
https://elections.maryland.gov/elections/2002/results/g_house_of_delegate.html (showing that
Delegate Casper R. Taylor, Jr. lost his election by less than one percent of the vote). The author’s
impression is that the impacts from having made such major changes to the 2002 enacted map have
left the Court of Appeals more reticent in reviewing subsequent challenges. It is not clear whether
the best process is for the Court to keep original jurisdiction, essentially exercised by an adjunct
special magistrate in the first instance, or if starting in the circuit court would allow the Court of
Appeals to act in its typical appellate role without an overall loss of timeliness in resolving these
often-urgent challenges to finality. MD. CONST. art. III, § 5 (jurisdiction to hear legislative districting
challenges); see also id. art. IV, §§ 20, 22 (jurisdiction of circuit courts, and in banc, three-judge,
circuit courts).
147. In re Legis. Districting of the State, 370 Md. at 323, 805 A.2d at 298.
148. Id. at 377, 805 A.2d at 331 (Raker, J., dissenting).
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effect of vitiating the political decisions made by the Governor and
Legislature—even to the extent that those decisions could have been
incorporated consistent with the overarching constitutional requirements. In
this regard, the Court of Appeals disregarded its earlier precedent.149 Judge
Raker objected to the majority’s finding that the enacted plan violated the
Maryland Constitution,150 to the majority’s method of remediating the
enacted plan by replacing it completely,151 and for not first giving the political
branches guidance with an opportunity to enact a remedial plan.152 In the
context of remediating congressional districts, a court must start with the
defective plan since “[i]t provides important guidance that helps ensure that
the district court appropriately confines itself to drawing interim maps that
comply with the Constitution and the Voting Rights Act, without displacing
legitimate state policy judgments with the court’s own preferences.”153 But
that presumes that the court has authority to remediate in the first place.
In light of the foregoing, it is clear that the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to remediate an enacted but impermissible map for General
Assembly districts if the political branches are unable to do so, even if the
remediation process may be unsettled. It then follows that a Maryland circuit
court would hold equivalent authority to impose appropriate relief for other
types of districts.154 But there are two theories why the circuit court might not
149. See supra notes 143–144 and accompanying text. The revisions were also inconsistent with
the Supreme Court’s remedial guidance to federal district courts in Perry v. Perez, 565 U.S. 388,
393 (2012), and Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 79 (1997). See supra note 133 (describing the
guidance in those cases in a manner similar to the process laid out in In re Legis. Districting of the
State, 271 Md. at 322–23, 317 A.2d at 477–78, as described in the text accompanying notes 146–
147).
150. See In re Legis. Districting of the State, 370 Md. at 376, 805 A.2d at 330; id. at 397–98,
805 A.2d at 343 (citing Beaubien v. Ryan, 762 N.E.2d 501, 505, 507 (Ill. 2001)).
151. See id. at 377–78, 805 A.2d at 331.
152. Id. at 395–99, 805 A.2d at 342–44 (quoting MD. CONST. Decl. of Rts., art. 8).
153. Perry, 565 U.S. at 394. “This Court has observed before that ‘faced with the necessity of
drawing district lines by judicial order, a court, as a general rule, should be guided by the legislative
policies underlying’ a state plan—even one that was itself unenforceable—‘to the extent those
policies do not lead to violations of the Constitution or the Voting Rights Act.’” Id. at 393 (quoting
Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 79 (1997)); see also U.S. CONST., art. I, § 4 (assigning state
legislatures the duty to regulate congressional elections).
154. It would be incongruous for a court to have jurisdiction to hear a case but not to order fullyappropriate relief. But see Getty v. Carroll Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 399 Md. 710, 741, 926 A.2d 216,
235 (2007) (rejecting the authority of a circuit court to draw an initial district map for county
commission districts, saying: “To be sure, the Circuit Court, as a trial court, not being accorded any
authority, either by Constitutional provision or through statutory law, has no jurisdiction to create
district lines.”). Most other states that have considered the issue have decided that the state court
holds such authority. See, e.g., League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737,
823–24 (Pa. 2018) (citing cases); Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm’n, 971 N.W.2d 402, 406 (Wis.
2022); In re Senate Joint Resol. of Legis. Apportionment 1176, 83 So. 3d 597, 599, 601 (Fla. 2012)
(citing express constitutional authority); Perry v. Del Rio, 67 S.W.3d 85, 93 (Tex. 2001). But see
OHIO CONST. art. XIX, § 03 (affording the Ohio Supreme Court original jurisdiction to review
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have such authority. First, if a “congressional district” is a form of
“legislative district” for which jurisdiction to hear challenges and grant
appropriate relief lies in the Court of Appeals.155 Second, the potentially
greater conflict with Article 8 of the Declaration of Rights, in part due to the
fully legislative nature of congressional districts compared to General
Assembly districts, and in part due to the lack of an express provision for
circuit courts, or for any Maryland court, to hear and address challenges to
congressional districts.156 The first theory seems unavailing, as Article III,
Section 5 appears limited in scope to General Assembly districts,157 but the
second is more compelling in light of Getty. From a procedural perspective,
a lack of authority to remediate an impermissible congressional map within
the Maryland judiciary could become extremely awkward. If a Maryland
court could enjoin but not ultimately fix an impermissible map, the Maryland
proceedings could conclude with the state having no permissible districts.
Then the parties, or even other Maryland voters not party to the challenge,
would have grounds to file a complaint as to the state’s lack of congressional
districts in the federal district court. The federal court would then have the
duty to revise the enacted map in order to make it permissible under federal
and Maryland law so that the elections for Maryland’s members of Congress
could proceed.158 Perhaps such a scenario augers against extending Getty to
congressional maps but not to remediate them); Mauldin v. Branch, 866 So. 2d 429, 433–34 (Miss.
2003) (holding the state’s chancery courts have no jurisdiction as to redistricting); id. at 436–38
(McRae, P.J., dissenting); id. at 443–44 (holding that the state’s circuit courts have jurisdiction even
if the chancery courts would not).
155. See MD. CONST. art. III, § 5. It is unlikely the Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction here extends
to congressional districts since the “legislative districts” addressed in this section are those for the
General Assembly. See id.
156. See Getty, 399 Md. at 741, 926 A.2d at 235. Compare MD. CONST. art. III, § 5 (authorizing
the Governor to set the bounds of legislative districts, but permitting the State House and Senate to
agree on an alternate plan, and affording the Court of Appeals with original jurisdiction to hear legal
challenges to such plans and grant appropriate relief), with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (authorizing state
legislatures to set the regulations for congressional elections, including the bounds of congressional
districts, but permitting Congress to enact overriding regulations). But see Getty, 339 Md. at 731–
32, 926 A.2d at 229 (prescribing a firm but not inflexible application of Article 8 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights). A conflict with Article 8 would apply equally to the Court of Appeals and
the circuit courts unless the Court of Appeals’ authority in Article III, Section 5 extends to resolving
disputes as to congressional districting. See MD. CONST. art. III, § 5; MD. CONST., Decl. of Rts., art.
8; see also supra notes 140, 141–142, 154–155 and accompanying text.
157. The court in Szeliga would presumably have had to dismiss the complaints if it had
determined that Article III, Section 5 applied to challenges of congressional districts. But cf. Szeliga
v. Lamone, No. C-02-CV-21-001816, at 20 (Md. Cir. Ct. Mar. 25, 2022) (interpreting “legislative
districts” in Article III, Section 4 of the Maryland Constitution to include congressional districts).
158. A similar scenario involving state legislative districts actually took place in Ohio in 2022.
See State ex rel. Demora v. LaRose, 2022-Ohio-2173, ¶¶ 5–17, 2022 WL 2285935, at *1–*4 (Ohio
June 24, 2022); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 32, Moore
v. Harper, No. 21-1271 (U.S. Oct. 26, 2022), 2022 WL 16556220; see also Perez, 565 U.S. at 391–
92 (citing Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 414–15 (1977)). While the federal district court would
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interpret Article 8 so as to preclude a circuit court from rectifying an
impermissible congressional map, and thus requiring the federal courts to
complete the remedy of a violation of Maryland law.159
III. WILL SZELIGA V. LAMONE REMAIN VIABLE AFTER MOORE V. HARPER?
The representational gains afforded by Szeliga v. Lamone have been
significant, but it is not clear how long they will last. Aside from the fact that
Szeliga, absent an affirmance by the appellate courts, has no precedential
value and limited persuasive authority,160 a state court judgment that limited
partisan gerrymandering under similar provisions of North Carolina’s
Constitution and Declaration of Rights is about to be reviewed by the U.S.
Supreme Court.161
The question presented is:
Whether a State’s judicial branch may nullify the regulations
governing the “Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives . . . prescribed . . . by the Legislature thereof,” and
replace them with regulations of the state courts’ own devising,
based on vague state constitutional provisions purportedly vesting
the state judiciary with power to prescribe whatever rules it deems
appropriate to ensure a “fair” or “free” election.162
likely start with the impermissible enacted map, it is not entirely clear whether the district court
would start with the enacted map or the prior map. See id. at 392. Perhaps a more awkward scenario
would occur if the plaintiffs appeal the insufficient remedy to the Court of Appeals, which would
either draw a remedial map or decide that it also lacks such authority. See also Mauldin, 866 So. 2d
at 436 (decrying the “default” and punt to the federal courts under state law).
159. Getty found that the appropriate remedy, in light of the General Assembly’s failure to enact
initial districts for electing Carroll County Commissioners, was to maintain an at-large election.
Getty, 399 Md. at 745, 926 A.2d at 237. Such a default solution is unavailable for congressional
districts, see 2 U.S.C. § 2c (requiring congressional elections to be by district), or even for existing
state or local districts, see Raleigh Wake Citizens Ass’n v. Wake Cty. Bd. of Elections, 827 F.3d
333, 340 (4th Cir. 2016) (requiring school board and county government districts to have equal
populations).
160. See Montgomery Park, LLC v. Md. Dep’t of Gen. Servs., 254 Md. App. 73, 103 n.7, 270
A.3d 993, 1010 n.7 (2022) (“Circuit court opinions aren’t prohibited strictly by Maryland Rule 1104, which prohibits citation to unreported opinions of this Court or the Court of Appeals, so we
deny the motion [to strike them]. Even so, . . . those opinions lack any precedential value . . . .”);
Pro. Bail Bonds v. State, 185 Md. App. 226, 242, 968 A.2d 1136, 1145 (2009) (“The Circuit Court
case has no precedential value and this Court is without the Montgomery County Judge’s rationale.”
(emphasis added)); cf. D.L. v. Sheppard Pratt Health Sys., Inc., 465 Md. 339, 359–60, 214 A.3d
521, 533 (2019) (“Although unreported opinions of our intermediate appellate court have no
precedential value and do not constitute persuasive authority, we highlight this case merely to
develop the history and varying perspectives . . . .”).
161. Harper v. Hall, 868 S.E.2d 499 (N.C. 2022), cert. granted sub nom., Moore v. Harper, No.
21-1271 (U.S. June 30, 2022).
162. Question Presented, Moore v. Harper, No. 21-1271 (U.S. June 30, 2022) (alterations in
original) (citation omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/21-01271qp.pdf.
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This question presented contains several critical fairly included
questions. The first is whether the U.S. Supreme Court has jurisdiction to
review the judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina.163 If the Court
determines that it has jurisdiction, it will then have to decide whether state
legislatures are subject to any limitations within their state constitutions in
carrying out their duties under the Elections Clause—i.e., the Independent
State Legislature Theory, which posits that state legislatures are only subject
to provisions of the federal Constitution when enacting statues pursuant to
the Elections Clause.164 If provisions of a state’s constitution do apply, the
Court will need to determine its standard for reviewing the Supreme Court of
North Carolina’s interpretation of the North Carolina Constitution and
Declaration of Rights.165 The upcoming decision in Moore may well be
influenced by the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by
Justices Scalia and Thomas, in Bush v. Gore,166 which found that the Florida
Supreme Court impermissibly altered the elections statutes enacted by the
Florida legislature.167
The decision will ostensibly have a positive impact on Szeliga if the
North Carolina judgment is affirmed. If the Supreme Court adopts some
version of the Independent State Legislature Theory,168 Szeliga could be
completely upended. If the judgment below is reversed by a holding that the
163. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (“Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a
State . . . may be reviewed by the Supreme Court . . . where any title, right, privilege, or immunity
is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution . . . of . . . the United States.”). The author has
filed a brief arguing that the Court lacks jurisdiction under this provision as petitioners have not
suffered such an injury since partisan favoritism is not authorized under the Elections Clause. See
Brief of Amicus Curiae Stephen M. Shapiro in Support of Respondents at 4–17, Moore v. Harper,
No. 21-1271 (U.S. Oct. 24, 2022), 2022 WL 14871924, at *4–*17.
164. See Saul Zipkin, Judicial Redistricting and the Article I State Legislature, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 350, 351–52 (2003); Brief of the National Republican Redistricting Trust as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioners at 7–12, Moore v. Harper, No. 21-1271 (U.S. Apr. 20, 2022), 2022 WL
1214894, at *7–*12.
165. Under the Court’s longstanding precedents, it affirms a state court interpretation of state
law, even if it results in a federal constitutional injury, unless it is “without any fair or substantial
support.” Wolfe v. North Carolina, 364 U.S. 177, 185–86 (1960) (citing NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 455 (1958); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 318 (1958); and Ward
v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 253 U.S. 17, 22 (1920)); Enter. Irrigation Dist. v. Farmers Mut. Canal
Co., 243 U.S. 157, 164 (1917). Note that this highly permissive standard is only for upholding a
state high court’s interpretation of state law. It is not the standard for determining whether a state
law itself may be permissible under federal law. Surprisingly, the petitioners’ merits briefs has
perhaps abandoned their contention, implied in the question presented, that the judgment below
lacked substantial support. See generally Brief for Petitioners, Moore v. Harper, No. 21-1271 (U.S.
Aug. 29, 2022), 2022 WL 4084287 (failing to expressly attack the state court’s interpretation of
state law). Thus, the Court may have no cause to review the judgment below if it rejects the
petitioners’ Independent State Legislature Theory.
166. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
167. Id. at 111 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
168. See supra note 167 and associated text.
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Supreme Court of North Carolina misinterpreted or misapplied specific
provisions of the North Carolina Constitution, then the impact on Szeliga may
turn on the similarities and differences between the provisions at issue and
the analyses of the courts. For example, while the court below in Harper also
mandated that North Carolina’s congressional districts must meet the
compactness requirements for its legislative districts,169 those remedial
requirements were not incorporated into that court’s discussion of a
justiciable standard.170
CONCLUSION
Szeliga v. Lamone has, at least for the moment, succeeded in limiting
partisan gerrymandering at the point where it would degrade effective
representation through noncontiguous or noncompact districts.171 Political
incentives to test Szeliga may increase if the U.S. House of Representatives
has a Republican majority after the 2022 elections, or if the holdings in
Szeliga are compromised by the upcoming U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Moore.
This Article offers some insights as to how the holdings in Szeliga might
be bolstered, such as with Article III, Section 49, or refined, such as through
a stricter interpretation of “adjoining territory” but a more lenient
interpretation of “due regard” for political and natural boundaries of
congressional districts. It also suggests that future population variances in
districts for state and local offices merit greater scrutiny, particularly where

169. Order at ¶ 8, Harper v. Hall, 867 S.E.2d 554, 558 (N.C. 2022) (citing N.C. CONST. art. II,
§§ 3, 5). The trial court interpreted the Order at paragraph 6, 867 S.E.2d at 557, to also require that
the remedial map meet partisan parity metrics, and further modified the remedial map enacted by
the legislature to increase its compactness as well as the number of Democratic-leaning seats. See
Order on Remedial Plans ¶¶ 34–35, 67–68, N.C. League of Conservation Voters, Inc. v. Hall, No.
21 CVS 015426 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 23, 2022). Compare N.C. GEN. ASSEMB., S.L. 2022-3
CONGRESS,
S.B.
745,
2021
Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg.
Sess.
(N.C.
2022),
https://webservices.ncleg.gov/ViewBillDocument/2021/53780/0/SL%202022-3%20%2019%20x%2036%20Map (enacted remedial map), with Interim Congressional, N.C. GEN.
ASSEMB.
(Feb.
23,
2022),
https://www.ncleg.gov/Files/GIS/Plans_Main/Congress_2022_Court/2022%20Interim%20Congre
ssional%20-%2011%20x%2017%20Map.pdf (interim map ordered by the Superior Court of North
Carolina for Wake County in Harper v. Hall, No. 21CVS015426, 2022 WL 2610499 (N.C. Super.
Ct. Feb. 23, 2022), aff’d 867 S.E.2d 554 (N.C. 2022), cert. granted sub nom., Moore v. Harper, No.
21-1271 (U.S. June 30, 2022)). The best interpretation of the Order and Opinion may be a key factor
in the U.S. Supreme Court’s disposition of the case.
170. Harper, 868 S.E.2d at 547–49.
171. Judge Battaglia commended the efforts of counsel for the Szeliga and Parrott plaintiffs and
for State defendants, and described the trial as a great experience for her law clerks. As a recent law
clerk (in another court), the author strongly agrees.
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such variances may favor or disfavor political parties in the context of
multimember districts. Beyond judicial action, it would be helpful for the
General Assembly to propose constitutional amendments expressly applying
Article III, Section 4 to congressional districts, and to afford Maryland courts
express authority to amend an enacted district map, as a last resort, in order
to rectify impermissible features to the extent necessary to cure the
deficiency.
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APPENDIX
Figure 1
December 2021 Enacted Congressional Districts172

172. December
2021
Enacted
Map,
DAVE’S
REDISTRICTING,
https://davesredistricting.org/maps#viewmap::f4532575-5bd7-487e-a7eb-b84ddf0c0b46
(last
visited Oct. 7, 2022). Reprinted with permission of Dave’s Redistricting App (“DRA”). The map
was created by the author using the “Dave’s Redistricting App” loaded with census block data
representing the December 2021 districts downloaded from the census block equivalency file for
the Legislative Redistricting Advisory Commission’s “Final Recommended Congressional District
Map” on the General Assembly’s web site. Prior election data on DRA is primarily from the Voting
and Election Science Team (“VEST”) hosted by Harvard University. See About DRA, DAVE’S
REDISTRICTING, https://davesredistricting.org/maps#aboutus (last visited Mar. 6, 2022); Voting and
Election
Science
Team,
HARV.
DATAVERSE,
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/electionscience (last visited Sept. 28, 2022); LRAC Final
Recommended Congressional District Map, MD. LEGIS. REDISTRICTING ADVISORY COMM’N,
supra note 3; see also supra note 3 (for the same map on the Maryland General Assembly’s web
site and the accompanying 2021 bill).
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Figure 2
Partisan & Racial Data for the December 2021 Enacted
Congressional Districts173

173. December 2021 Enacted Map: “Statistics” Tab, DAVE’S REDISTRICTING,
https://davesredistricting.org/maps#viewmap::f4532575-5bd7-487e-a7eb-b84ddf0c0b46
(last
visited Oct. 7, 2022). Reprinted with permission of DRA. See supra note 172 for further information
and credits on DRA.
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Figure 3
April 2022 Enacted Congressional Districts174

174. April
2022
Enacted
Map:
“Map”
Tab,
DAVE’S
REDISTRICTING,
https://davesredistricting.org/maps#viewmap::3f662a78-0876-488b-9a7f-02a48a2f1651
(last
visited Oct. 7, 2022). Reprinted with permission of DRA. Census block data downloaded from
“Congressional Districts Block Equivalency Files,” is available at 2022 Maryland Congressional
Districts, supra note 78. See also supra note 172 (for further information and credits on Dave’s
Redistricting App); supra note 8 (for the same map, on the Maryland Department of Planning web
site).
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Figure 4
Partisan & Racial Data for the April 2022 Enacted Congressional
Districts175

175. April
2022
Enacted
Map:
“Statistics”
Tab,
DAVE’S REDISTRICTING,
https://davesredistricting.org/maps#viewmap::3f662a78-0876-488b-9a7f-02a48a2f1651
(last
visited Oct. 7, 2022). Reprinted with permission of DRA. See supra note 167 for further information
and credits on DRA.

